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Book Review
HANDBOOK OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, Third Edition. By
Herbert F. Goodrich, assisted by Paul A. Wolkin, St. Paul:
West Publishing Company, 1949. Pp. XIX, 729. $6.50.
The third edition of this hornbook follows the general
lines of the earlier ones. There are many sections which are
very nearly verbatim copies of the 1938 edition and, in fact,
the black type section headings have suffered surprisingly
little alteration. The main revisions center about the chapters dealing with those fields where constitutional law and
the conflict of laws overlap, in particular, taxation, divorce,
res judicata,and Workmen's Compensation.
Because there have been so many marked developments in the field of conflict of laws since publication of
the second edition in 1938, the third edition of Judge Goodrich's text fills a very present need. Only several of such
modifications will be mentioned.
Perhaps the beginning of one of the more important
developments took place in 1938 when Mr. Justice Brandeis handed down the now famous decision of Erie R. R.
Co. v. Tompkins.1 For the previous ninety-six years before
the coup de grace of Swift v. Tyson' a federal court had
been free to apply, in a diversity case, its own conception
of common law. Then, in the same year as the publication
of the second edition of the work being reviewed, the established rule was reversed by the Erie case. The author
in the 1938 edition recognized the abolition of the earlier
doctrine and in a short paragraph commented thereupon,
saying, "Thus, today the federal courts have no independent rules of common law and therefore Conflict of
Laws, but must follow the rules established in the state
courts of their district."' This was truly a prophetic interpretation of the meaning of the Erie case.
Of course the opinion had stated, "Except in matters
governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the
State."4 However, the Court had then remanded the case
2304 U. S. 64, 114 A. L. R. 1487 (1938).
216 Pet. 1 (U. S. 1842).
8Text, 2d ed., 24.
'Supra, n. 1, 78.
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to the federal court sitting in New York where the Pennsylvania law (lex loci delicti) was applied. If this was an application by the federal court of the conflict of laws rule
of New York, it was not recognized as such. Indeed the
author's prediction of the effect of Erie as applied to conflict of
laws was not conclusively fulfilled until three years
5
later.
The present edition contains an enlarged and able discussion of the Erie rule. The author describes the development of the doctrine as it has been extended to include
conflict of laws, 6 burden of proof,7 limitations 8 and, in fact,
any rule of the state which, if not applied by the federal
court sitting therein, would bring about an important
difference in the result.'
Well accented in this portion of the text is the underlying policy of Erie, viz. statewide uniformity of result,
whether a case be decided by the court of a state or a federal court sitting therein.
Another area of conflict of laws litigation in which the
passage of a dozen years has brought about considerable
change is that of jurisdiction for divorce and "full faith
and credit" of a decree rendered at the domicil of one
spouse. Haddock" and its predecessor, Atherton," though
causing confusion and evoking criticism in the legal periodicals, were the rule in 1938 and were ably described and
explained in the second edition.2 But with the first Williams case 3 decided in 1942, the rules of the Haddock doctrine became outmoded. No longer would matrimonial
domicil have an exalted importance and no longer in the
1938 edition might there be found much present value in
the ten pages of text material, 4 the eight citations to
Haddock, and the four citations to Atherton.
In the present and third edition, the author has, of
course, revised the section pertaining to the problem. The
question of single domicil divorces is developed through
Haddock and Williams and indeed the discussion includes
5Klaxon v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U. S. 487 (1941) and Griffin
v.. McCoach, 313 U. S. 498 (1941), both noted, State Conflict Of Laws Rules
In 6 The Federal Courts, 6 Md. L. Rev. 160 (1942).
Ibid.
Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U. S. 109 (1943).
8
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99 (1945).
90Angel v. Bullington, 330 U. S. 183 (1947).
1 Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562 (1906), dicussed in Strahorn,
A Rationale of the Haddock Case, 32 Ill. L. R. 796 (1938).
n Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155 (1901).
n Text, 2d ed., 341, et seq.
Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287 (1942).
" Supra, n. 12.
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the recent important and fascinating
"divisible divorce"
6
cases of Estin1 5 and Kreiger..
A third change of some importance concerns the application of res judicata to the jurisdiction of a court over
the subject matter. The departure began with Davis v.
Davis, 7 a case also decided in 1938, the publication year
of the second and earlier edition. The decision, however,
apparently was handed down by the Supreme Court too
late for inclusion in the text. The second edition therefore,
declares what was then thought to be the rule, viz., "....
when a court's authority depends upon jurisdiction over
status or subject matter, it has long been said that no res
judicata effect could be given to a finding by the court that
it has jurisdiction."'
This rule was superseded by Davis, at least in so far
as a party is barred from collaterally attacking the jurisdiction of a court to grant a divorce when the question of
jurisdiction had been actually litigated in that court. A
companion case, Stoll v. Gottlieb 9 substantiated the
changed rule, holding that jurisdiction over the res, once
litigated, may not be collaterally attacked. These cases
and their meaning have been incorporated in the present
edition and furthermore the increased scope of the Davis
doctrine brought about by the recent cases of Sherrer20
and Coe2 has been recognized and commented upon.2 2
It might be noted that the author unqualifiedly states
that the principle of these latter cases is not applicable to
bar a criminal action by public authorities for bigamy or
adultery. 3 The categorical comment appears somewhat
incautious in view of the "full faith and credit" idiom which
is found throughout the Sherrerand Coe opinions.
It is interesting to note the author's evident shift from
advocacy or at least a general acceptance of the "vested
rights" theory which was obvious in the earlier editions
to the "local law" theory. A quotation from the second and
third editions will suffice to show the apparent change of
'Estin v. Estin, 334 U. S._541 (1948), noted, And Now That You Have
Your Divorce, Where Do You Stand? 10 Md. L. R. 256 (1949).
16Krieger v. Krieger, 334 U. S. 555 (1948), noted, ibid.
'7305 U. S. 32 (1938).
Text, 2d ed., 33, 555.
16305 U. S. 165 (1938).
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U. S. 343 (1948), noted, Res JudicataAnd Interstate Divorce, 11 Md. L. R. 143 (1950).
'Coe v. Coe, 334 U. S. 378 (1948), noted, ibid.
2Text, 3d ed. 56, 400.
"Text, 3d ed., 401.
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attitude. Whereas in the second edition Judge Goodrich
states,
... It is a principle of civilized law that rights
once vested under the law continue until destroyed
or cut off by law, and that such rights are recognized
and enforced in one state though they have come into
being in another, unless such enforcement, is for good
reason, thought contrary to the public policy of the
jurisdiction where enforcement is sought."2 4
yet in the third edition the language is changed to read,
"... it is a principle of civilized law that a court
will not resolve a dispute before it which involves
foreign elements as if it were deciding a case all of
the facts of which occurred in its own state. It will,
instead, look to the law of the other state or states
involved, and consonant with other considerations that
may 2be
of concern, seek a result conforming to that
5
law."
The reason for the change in approach is not easily discernable. Perhaps a hint may be found in the preface of
the third edition where Judge Goodrich declares, "As years
go by, however, there seems to me less compulsion about
rules
except as the Constitution provides
conflict of laws 26
'
the compulsion.
Whatever be Judge Goodrich's theory of conflict of
laws, the Handbook of the Conflict of Laws is a necessary
addition to any legal library. The busy practitioner as
well as the cloistered student of law can profit by this upto-date single volume work.
L. WHrBNG FABRNIOLT, JR.*
Text, 2d ed., 11.
Text, 3d ed., 14.
Preface, 3d ed., V.
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law.

